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I am very pleased to be able to hold a presentation in this conference. I would like to ex-
press my gratitude to all those who offered me this opportunity.   
Today, I would like to talk about the phenomenological notion of sense. This notion 
has been extensively discussed by Husserl scholars, especially in relation to Frege. How-
ever, its relationship to Heidegger’s question of the “meaning of the Being” has not been 
investigated. Therefore I am going to focus on this aspect of the Husserlian notion of 
sense.  
It is widely accepted that both Frege and Husserl distinguished between sense and 
reference. However, in Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Ideas I, there is a notion of 
sense, of which we cannot find any exact equivalent in Frege. Husserl calls this notion 
“fulfilling sense” in LI and “noematic sense” in Ideas I. The close relationship between 
fulfilling sense and noema is confirmed through the footnote in §88 of Ideas I.  
However, it is not easy to understand what he means by these notions. The following 
passage in §25 of the 6
th
 Investigation can give us a hint how they are to be interpreted. 
[Citation begins.] “One might therefore be tempted– I myself hesitated long on this 
point – to define meaning as this very ‘matter’, which would, however, have the inconven-
ience that the moment of assertion in, e.g., a predicative statement, would fall outside of 
that statement’s meaning.” [Citation ends.] By “matter”, Husserl means intentional mat-
ter or intension which determines the reference to a certain object, i. e. the Fregean con-
cept of “sense”. Also Frege takes assertion into account and distinguishes the mere grasp 
of thought from the recognition of its truth value and assertion. Nevertheless, his interest 
is restricted to the recognition of truth value which must be independent of the first per-
son perspective of a judging subject. As long as the recognition of a truth value is con-
cerned, the meaning of tense, for example, can be ignored, because the truth value doesn’t 
change with time.
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Compared with Frege, Husserl deals with assertion together with other illocutionary 
forces like expectation, remembrance etc. which he calls act-quality in LI and noetic char-
acter in Ideas I. This is because, in his study of the intentionality, Husserl is oriented to 
the performance in perception. If I move, objects will show from different perspectives. 
Together with the change of the perspectives, the illocutionary force of my propositional 
attitude will also change.  Although Husserl articulates the concept “kinesthesis” first in 
the lecture “Thing and Space” in 1907, this concept is already implied in his notion of 
“fulfilling” in LI.  
I have, for instance, an expectation that the back side of a cube is a square. If I move 
and find out that the side is really a square, then my expectation is fulfilled. In this case, I 
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can also utter: The back side must be a square; this side is indeed a square. It is important 
not to formalize these expressions as P with illocutionary forces, because Husserl’s in-
sight resides in the very fact that the illocutionary force of propositional attitudes to-
wards perceptual objects can be understood in the direct acquaintance with their perspec-
tive appearance which he calls adumbration (Abschattung). The change of the illocu-
tionary force from an expectation to an assertion is apprehended in combination with the 
change of the perspectives. Besides, the change of the perspectives is recognized not 
through intentional matter like side or square, but the change of sense of indexicals, mod-
al verbs and tense of copula, that is, the fulfilling sense of categorial expressions. Although 
the fulfilling sense or the noematic sense is related to an object, this is not the relation 
through the signification act, but the intuitive relation by the intuitive act.  
In order to analyze the Husserlian notion of sense further, the concept of subjectivity 
must be clarified. The subjectivity was conceived by Frege as opposite of the objectivity 
of linguistic sense. After the behaviorist’s critique, the subjectivity seems to be exorcized 
from the field of linguistic sense. However, this critique takes only the Cartesian notion 
of subjectivity into account, and Frege left the linguistic subjectivity of indexical expres-
sions unsolved as incommunicable. The sense of indexical expressions is surely not objec-
tive in the same sense as true mathematical propositions or true descriptions of physical 
structures. This kind of truth is in principle perspective-free, or in Husserl’s words, 
“Wahrheit an sich”, whereas the truth of indexical expressions is subjective or dependent 
on a certain perspective. But it is still inter-subjectively accessible as expressions from the 
third person perspective of an utterer. Therefore, we need a new notion of subjectivity 
which can be harmonized not with the perspective-free objectivity, but with the inter-
subjectivity of linguistic sense.  
For this purpose, the notion of perspective must be now examined. Here I support 
the interpretation of noema by Aron Gurwitsch as one of possible aspects of the percep-
tual object.
2
 This interpretation is mistakenly associated with Berkeleyan phenomenalism 
by some Husserl scholars.
3
 Instead, the noema is the basis of the non-Cartesian subjectiv-
ity, which I would like to call life-world subjectivity. This is distinguished from the Carte-
sian subjectivity, because it includes the spatiality within its scope. After the Cartesian 
definition of subjectivity as a sphere of incorrigibility, the spatiality has been excluded 
from the scope of subjectivity, because the knowledge of spatial objects is always exposed 
to a possible doubt. Thus, inside the Cartesian tradition, the space is reduced to the per-
spective-free structure of geometrical space, and the Cartesian subject loses sight of the 
perspective space-structures, such as right, left, up, down, near, far, although it incessant-
ly makes use of them in everyday actions. And this flaw of the Cartesian subjectivity is 
still not eliminated from the contemporary discussion about qualia or mental events, inso-
far as the ontological status of perspective directions is left unquestioned.  
Berkeley famously criticized Lockean primary qualities, because their appearance is 
never without secondary qualities and therefore dependent on the first person perspective. 
But he wrongly identified this dependence with the existence within the mind.
4
 However, 
it is clear that the perspective appearance of spatial objects such as front, back, right or 
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left, are not something mental, although they are not a physical structure of objects and 
their existence is dependent on a standpoint of a perceiver. Husserl writes in Ideas I: “The 
adumbrating is a mental process (Erlebnis).  But a mental process is possible only as a 
mental process, and not as something spatial. However the adumbrated is of essential ne-
cessity possible only as something spatial, […] and not possible as mental process” (Ideas 
I, p. 88). And “what is “presented”, “adumbrated” […] belongs in the noema” (ibid. p. 
238). [Citation ends.]  The noema is therefore an utterly “non-selfsufficient” object. [Ci-
tation begins.] “Its esse consists exclusively of its “percipi” – except that this proposition 
does not have Berkeleyian sense because here the percipi does not include the esse as a 
real component (reelles Bestandstück)” (ibid. p. 241).5 [Citation ends.] In other words, 
the being of the spatial adumbration of perceived objects are dependent on the point of 
view of a perceiver, but this spatial being must be distinguished from the non-spatial be-
ing of the perception as mental process. 
This is a decisive step that leads to a revolution in the field of subjectivity, which we 
can observe in Ideas II. If the front side of a cube motivates me to assume that its back 
side must be a square, it is neither the physical structure of the cube nor its causal relation 
to the physical structure of my body, but the perspective appearance of the cube that mo-
tivates me. “Because the front side is a square”, this is the reason why I make the assump-
tion about the back side. In correlation to the mode of appearance of her surrounding 
world, the body of a person must be viewed not in respect of its physical structure, but as 
a center of orientation in her life-world. Husserl writes: “It is evident what foundational 
sense there is to the relation between man as personal subject and the objects of his sur-
rounding world versus the natural relation between the naturally understood man (as psy-
chophysical reality) and other realities. “Stimuli” are said to be emitted especially by the 
physical Objects of nature, and the sensitive nerves are said to be stimulated by physical 
excitations. […] But if we place ourselves on the terrain of the intentional relation be-
tween subject and Object, the relation between person and surrounding world, then the 
concept of stimulus acquires a fundamentally new sense. Instead of the causal relation 
between things and men as natural realities, there is substituted the relation of motivation 
between persons and things, and these things are not […] the things of exact natural sci-
ence with the determinations which gives them only objective truth value (die sie als allein 
objectiv wahre gelten läßt) […] but are the experienced, […] things as such, intentional 
objects of personal consciousness” (Ideas II, p. 198f.). [Citation ends.]  
Here, Husserl clearly distinguishes the “space of reasons” from natural facts like brain 
process, but his “space of motivations” cannot be a “frictionless spinning in a void”, be-
cause it is embedded in the spatio-temporal structure of a life-world. It is namely the con-
ceptual structure of adumbrated objects as themselves which prescribes the scope of pos-
sible expectations about perceptual objects. Depending on the force of motivations or the 
reason of expectations, an expected aspect of a perceptual object appears in different 
modes, which Husserl calls noematic character. The back side of a cube appears, for in-
stance, as a square in almost necessary mode of being, which is understood as the sense of 
“must be”, whereas its color appears only in possible mode of being, which is understood 
as the sense of “can be”. If the expectations are fulfilled, these beings of the cube appear 
in the mode of actuality, which is understood as the sense of “is indeed”. Thus, as Husserl 
describes in an article “Sense and Noema”, “the changing noematic mode of appearance of 
the whole object as sense” (Husserliana vol. XI, p. 333) [Citation ends.] is the background 
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or horizon, in implicit acquaintance with which the illocutionary force of propositional 
attitudes towards perceptual objects, i. e. the correlation of noetic and noematic charac-
ters can be understood. Husserl could not restrict his notion of sense to proposition or to 
its perspective-free truth value, because illocutionary forces of our intentional life are to 
be interpreted only against the background of the perspective dependent spatio-temporal 
structure of life-world.  
One might object that, despite its spatiality, the life-world subjectivity is still solipsis-
tic. Fulfilling sense as direct acquaintance with perspective appearance of objects seems to 
be limited to a first person perspective. However, if we hear indexical expressions of oth-
ers, we can understand their sense, although, strictly speaking, nobody else can have the 
exactly same access to the perspective appearance of the life-world of an utterer. If I hear 
someone saying: “the back side of this cube must be a square”, I don’t have to observe 
directly the cube and person to understand the sense of “back”. The spatial relationship 
between the person and cube is implied in the expression, together with other directions, 
and also with the temporal structure of the retained past perception, the present percep-
tion and the future oriented expectation. Put differently, indexical expressions of others 
can be appropriately interpreted only against the spatio-temporal background of an utter-
er. If we understand indexical expressions of others, we are, so to say, put in their place 
through empathy, as if we were in their position. The empathy is not a magical faculty, but 
an ability we have to presuppose to make sense of our factual usage of indexical expres-
sions. We are indirectly acquainted with the background of indexical expressions of others 
in analogy with the spatio-temporal structure of our own life-world.  
Husserl calls the indirect acquaintance with the background of other persons as 
“appresence” (Appräsenz) in distinction to the primal presence (Urpräsenz) as direct ac-
quaintance with one’s own life-world. He writes: “My appearance belongs to me, his to 
him. Only in the manner of appresence can I have, co-given with his Body, his appearanc-
es and his “here”, to which they are related” (Ideas II, p. 177). “If I posit, […] a thing as 
Objectively actual, then I am thereby also positing, for every posited subject, existing 
unities of appearance, i. e., unities of validity which are indices for rules of lived experi-
ences of perception […] that are intentionally related to these “appearances”. All these 
“phenomenal” things are what they are only as noematic correlates of the perceptual lived 
experiences of the man in question” (ibid. p. 178). [Citation ends] In another place of 
Ideas II, Husserl calls the “rules of lived experiences” the ““grammar” of “expressions of 
life of soul” (ibid. p. 175). Indexical expressions are namely the grammar of intentional 
life which implies, as its background, the perspective appearance of surrounding objects, 
that is, the noematic correlates of an intentional life. Thus, the phenomenological notion 
of sense as acquaintance with background is, as the grammar of intentional life, inter-
subjectively accessible.  
It is this phenomenological notion of sense that Heidegger bears in mind, when he 
defines in BT the sense as the “in-respect-of-which (Woraufhin) of the primary project” 
(SZ, p.324). If a carpenter utters: “the hammer is too heavy”, the hammer is interpreted in 
respect of the spaio-temporal structure of a life-world presupposed by a practical delibera-
tion. As we can observe in the lecture in the summer semester 1925, he still uses the 
Husserlian concept of “appresentation” to define his notion of sense (GA20 p. 292, 330). 
Heidegger calls the mode of being like “being too heavy” of a hammer the “character of 
meaningfulness” (Bedeutsamkeitscharakter, GA18, p. 300, SZ, p. 87). If we understand 
the utterance and its performative aspects, our interpretation of them is enabled through 
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the pre-ontological project as pre-reflective acquaintance with the meaningful character of 
the world, which Heidegger calls “acquaintance” or “familiarity with the world” 
(Weltvertrautheit, SZ, p. 86). This is precisely the hermeneutic development of the 
Husserlian noematic character with the aid of Diltheyan concept of meaningfulness and 
also of the Aristotelian practical philosophy, as it can be observed in his early Freiburg 
and Marburg lectures.  
